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Cartwright: ERISA Opportunities in the Ninth Circuit

NOTE
WHY FIGHT FOUGHT?:
A MISSED ERISA OPPORTUNITY IN
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
INTRODUCTION

In passing the Employment Retirement Income Securities Act
("ERISA"), Congress intended to address defects in the private
retirement system. 1 ERISA legislation established procedures to protect
private employee pension and welfare plans. 2 These procedures included
allowing plan administrators the discretion to interpret the terms of a
plan when deciding whether to grant benefits. 3 Under ERISA, if a plan
administrator denies benefits, a claimant can obtain review in a federal

I See H.R. REp. No. 93-533 (1973), 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat. 832) 4639, 4639; see also
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406 (codified at 29 U.S.c.A. §
1001 et seq. (West 2007)).
2 See id. at 4640.
Welfare plans are plans that provide benefits other than retirement
income. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 117-18 (4th ed. 2006).
They typically cover life, accident, occupational disability benefits, severance or termination, and
health care plans. Id.
3 In Firestone Tire & Rubber Company v. Bruch, the United States Supreme Court implied
that if a plan administrator is granted discretion to construe the terms of a plan, then the
administrator's decision is given an "abuse of discretion" review by the district court. See Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Since Firestone, a body of law has
developed among the circuits to decide whether a plan gives discretion to an administrator. See
Alison S. Rozbruch, Note, Resolving the Conflict Between Two Visions for a Standard of Review in
ERISA Denial of Benefit Claims, 9 J.L. & POL'y 507, 526-27 (2001) (discussing the circuit split
regarding the specific language necessary for invoking a deferential standard of review); Peter A.
Meyers, Comment, Discretionary Language, Conflicts of Interest, and Standard of Review for
ERISA Disability Plans, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 925, 934 (2005) (examining how discretion given to
plan fiduciaries is detrimental to disability claimants).
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district court.4 While ERISA did not establish a standard of review in
those cases, the United States Supreme Court said that an "abuse of
discretion" standard applies when the administrator has discretion to
interpret the terms of a plan. 5 A more complicated issue arises when the
administrator has a conflict of interest. 6
Typically, a conflict of interest arises when a plan administrator is
responsible for both funding the ERISA benefits and determining who
may receive them. 7 The circuits remain split, however, on the best way
to evaluate a denial of benefits when an administrator has a conflict of
interest. s The Supreme Court gave some guidance in Firestone Tire &
Rubber Company v. Bruch,9 indicating an "abuse of discretion" standard
should be used to review an administrator's decision when the benefit
plan in question gives discretion to the administrator. IO Yet, in the case
of an administrator with a conflict. of interest, the circuits have
interpreted this in a variety of ways and have created different standards
of review depending on the extent to which the conflict influenced the
administrator's decision. II
This Note analyzes the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
4 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 (a)(I)(B) (West 2007) (stating that "[a] civil action may be brought by
... a participant or beneficiary ... to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan.").
5 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
6 See generally Nola A. Kohler, Note, An Overview of the Inconsistency Among the Circuits
Concerning the Conflict of Interest Analysis Applied in an ERISA Action with an Emphasis on the
Eighth Circuit's Adoption of the Sliding Scale Analysis in Woo v. Deluxe Corporation, 75 N.D. L.
REv. 815 (1999); John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 207,
207, 222 (identifying the issue of whether a court should adopt a deferential standard of review or
apply a de novo standard when a claimant sues after an administrator has denied his or her claim).
7 See Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 965 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane)
(citing Tremain v. Bell Indus. Inc., 196 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 1999)).
8 See infra notes 53-116 and accompanying text (describing the standards of review used by
the various circuits); see also Rozbruch, supra note 3, at 526-28; Kohler supra note 6 at 816-817,
827-859.
9 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. For a general review of the history of Firestone see Donald T.
Bogan & Benjamin Fu, Article, ERISA: No Further Inquiry Into Conflicted Plan Administrator
Claim Denials, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 637, 644-49 (2005).
10 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
II The general steps a district court follows in reviewing a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132
(a)(1)(B) are: I) determine whether discretion is granted to the plan administrator through the terms
of the plan, 2) determine that the administrator used his or her discretion in making the decision, 3)
determine that a conflict of interest is present, 4) analyze how the conflict of interest influenced the
administrator's decision, 5) determine the standard of review based on the influence of the conflict
of interest; and 6) apply the standard to the review of the administrator's decision. The Firestone
decision affects the fifth step, but the circuits are split on exactly how that conflict of interest is
factored in with an "abuse of discretion" review of the administrator's decision. See infra notes 53116 and accompanying text (describing the circuit split).
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Circuit's standard of review in cases in which a conflicted administrator
has denied benefits. Part I of this Note examines early standards of
review prior to ERISA. 12 Part II sets forth the split among the circuits in
evaluating a conflicted administrator's denial of benefits and explains the
Ninth Circuit's former standard. 13 Part ill compares the Ninth Circuit's
prior standard of finding such denials presumptively void with its recent
holding in Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Insurance Company, in which the
court effectively adopted a unique standard similar to a "sliding scale"
used by other circuits that considers the extent to which a conflict of
interest may alter the "abuse of discretion" standard. 14 Part IV argues
that the Ninth Circuit took a positive step in lessening the burden on
plaintiffs in such cases, but left the district courts without guidance as to
the extent a conflict of interest may alter the "abuse of discretion"
standard. 15 Part IV concludes that by adopting the Tenth Circuit's
approach, whereby a conflict is categorized in addition to being weighed
on a "sliding scale," the Ninth Circuit could provide clearer direction to
district courts for balancing a conflict of interest with all the facts in
cases in which benefits have been denied. 16
I.

BACKGROUND: ERISA AND EARLY STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A.

THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT ("ERISA")
AND EARLY STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Congress passed ERISA in 1974 because it thought employers were
not doing enough to protect worker's benefits. 17 ERISA, which governs
private employer benefit plans, including pension and retirement plans,
also covers disability and medical benefits. 18 The legislation was
intended to protect the interests of participants and their beneficiaries by
See infra notes 17·52 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 53-116 and accompanying text.
14 See Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955,969 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane); see
also infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 131-64 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 165-89 and accompanying text.
17 See Kirill Y. Abramov, Woo v. Deluxe Corporation: The Eighth Circuit Adopts the
"Sliding Scale" Standard of Review When a Conflicted Plan Administrator Denies ERISA-Protected
Benefits, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1369, 1370 (1999); see also H.R. REp. No. 93-533 (1973), 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat. 832) 4639, 4641 (quoting a Presidential fact-finding commission stating that
"all industry in the absence of adequate Government programs, owes an obligation to workers to
provide for maintenance of the human body in the form of medical and similar benefits and full
depreciation in the form of old age retirement-- in the same way as it now does for plant and
machinery.").
18 See 29 U.S.c.A. § 1002(1) (West 2007); see also LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 17-18.
12
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requiring disclosure and reporting of financial information, establishing
standards of conduct and responsibilities, and providing remedies and
sanctions. 19 The statute specifically preempts state law 20 and allows for
suit to be brought in federal court. 21
ERISA established standards for the administration and design of
pension and benefit plans covered by the Act. 22 ERISA's goal is to
regulate benefit plans so beneficiaries get what they expect, but also to
provide procedural processes to keep costs down so employers can afford
to offer these benefit plans. 23 Plans can be set up in a variety of ways,
but the most relevant to this discussion is where an "employer pay[s] an
independent insurance company to fund, interpret, and administer a
plan.,,24
Every ERISA plan must have procedures for a full and fair review
within the claims process. 25 An internal review procedure serves two
purposes: first, it "permit[s] a plan's administrators to resolve disputes in
an efficient, streamlined, non-adversarial manner"; second, it protects
plan participants from "arbitrary or unprincipled decision-making.,,26 If
the administrator is also funding the plan, a conflict of interest arises that
a reviewing court must factor into its analysis. 27 Most circuits use
similar approaches in evaluating a decision made by a conflicted
19 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (b) (West 2007):
[T]he policy of this chapter [is] to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to
participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
20 See 29 U.S.c.A. § I I 44(a) (West 2007) (establishing that ERISA preempts state law).
21 See 29 U.S.c.A. § l132(a)(I)(B) (West 2007) (allowing individuals to bring suit in federal
court to enforce their right to benefits).
22 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406 (codified at
29 U.S.C.A. 1001 et seq. (West 2007». The purpose of the bill was to:
(I) establish equitable standards of plan administration; (2) mandate minimum standards of plan
design with respect to the vesting of plan benefits; (3) require minimum standards of fiscal
responsibility by requiring the amortization of unfunded liabilities; (4) insure the vested portion of
unfunded liabilities against the risk of premature plan termination; and (5) promote a renewed
expansion of private retirement plans and increase the number of participants receiving private
retirement benefits.
H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 1-2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640.
23 See Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50
AM. U. L. REV. 1083, 1087-88 (2001); see also Rozbruch, supra note 3, at 515.
24 See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 2000).
25 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1133 (West 2007); see also Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228,
236 (4th Cir. 1997).
26 See Ellis, 126 F.3d at 236 (citing Weaver v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 990 F.2d
154,157 (4th Cir. 1993».
27 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,115 (1989).
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administrator; however, the smaller details of weighing the conflict and
the burdens of proof differ among all the circuits, and no two circuits use
exactly similar methods for evaluating a conflicted administrator. 28
ERISA does not set out a standard of review for district courts
reviewing claims for denial of benefits. 29 Instead, Congress apparently
left it up to federal common law to determine how to review these
claims. 3D Before the Supreme Court spoke in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company v. Bruch,31 courts used general contract law to review a denial
of benefits?2 Later, courts adopted the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard from the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
("LMRA,,).33
Under contract principles, if according to the contract between the
employer and the employee the benefits were considered a gratuity to the
employee, the worker could not enforce those benefits in court?4 After
the LMRA was passed, the courts used its standard of review in ERISA
cases. 35 Though the LMRA allowed unions to set up pension plans
jointly with employers, it did not provide a standard of review for claims
regarding those pension plans. 36 As a result, federal courts adopted the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. 37 Because ERISA did not provide a
standard of review, the courts began using this "arbitrary and capricious"
standard from LMRA cases. 38 The courts rationalized the use of this
approach because ERISA's fiduciary-duty provisions were similar to the
fiduciary provisions in the LMRA. 39 However, the Supreme Court
28 See infra notes 53-116 and accompanying text; see also Daniel Feinberg, Abatie v. Alta
Health - A Victory for Plaintiffs on the Standard of Review, 14 No.5 ERISA LITIG. REp. (NEWSL.)
7,11 (2006).
29 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109. For an excellent overview of the history of post-Firestone
decisions, see generally Kennedy, supra note 23.
30 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1089-90.
31 See generally Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
32 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1096-1100.
33 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109; see also Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1097. For an
overview of pre-ERISA benefits law, see Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITT.
L. REv. 1,35-46 (1992).
34 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1096 & n.54 (citing Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786,
790 (8th Cir. 1944) ("holding the pension awards as mere gratuities and not contractual promises"));
see also, Bogan & Fu, supra note 9, at 645-46.
35 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1101.
36 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1101; see also Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109.
37 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1101; see also Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109 .
38 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1103-04.
39 See Rozbruch, supra note 3, at 521-22 (quoting Bayles v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas
Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 99-100 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979)) ("Federal courts justified this approach on
the grounds that 'because Congress intentionally drafted ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions to be
similar to the fiduciary provisions set forth in the earlier LMRA, the "arbitrary and capricious" or

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 5

568

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

explicitly disapproved of this approach in Firestone and changed the
standard of review. 40
B.

THE SUPREME COURT'S VAGUE PRECEDENT: THE FIRESTONE
STANDARD

In Firestone,41 the Supreme Court set the standard for use by district
courts in reviewing actions under 29 U.S.c. § 1132(a)(1)(B).42 The
Court used trust principles to hold that a denial of benefits under §
1132(a)(1)(B) would be reviewed de novo unless the plan gave
discretionary authority to the administrator or fiduciary to determine
eligibility for benefits or construe terms of the plan. 43 If an administrator
was given discretion to interpret and apply plan terms, the conflict of
interest would be "weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining whether there
[was] an abuse of discretion. ",44 The Court reasoned that "ERISA
abounds with the language and terminology of trust law.,,45 Trust
principles allow for a deferential standard of review when a trustee
exercises discretionary powers.46
Under ERISA, an administrator is also a fiduciary and "is
responsible for managing plan assets, determining eligibility for plan
benefits, and construing plan terms.,,47 ERISA incorporated the use of a
fiduciary similar to a trustee in order to protect against the misuse of

abuse of discretion standard used there was appropriate for reviewing benefit denials by ERISA
fiduciaries. "').
40 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110; see also Rozbruch, supra note 3, at 522-23; Langbein,
supra note 6, at 216.
41 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. The case involved terminated employees trying to claim
benefits under an ERISA plan. Id. at 105-06. For a detailed description of the facts of the case and
holding see Kohler, supra note 6, at 823-829; see also Abramov, supra note 17, at 1375-76.
42 29 U.S.c. § 1132(a)(I)(B) specifically provides for suits in federal court: "(a) Persons
empowered to bring a civil action. A civil action may be brought--(I) by a participant or beneficiary
... (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C.A.
§ I I 32(a)(I)(B) (West 2007).
43 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. But see Langbein, supra note 6, at 223 (discussing the
Supreme Court's application in Firestone as an inaccurate version of trust law to ERISA decisions).
44 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cm!. d
(1959».
45 See id. at 110 (citations omitted).
46 See id. at III (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959».
47 See Meyers, supra note 3, at 932 (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115); see also Dana M.
Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2. U. PA.
1. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 405 (2000) (explaining that the fiduciary model of ERISA was meant to
apply benefits administration (welfare plans) as well as asset administration (pension plans».
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funds, a problem predating the enactment of ERISA. 48 When reviewing
issues of trust law, a court generally will not substitute its judgment for
that of the trustee unless there was an abuse of the trustee's discretion. 49
The Supreme Court referred to factors from the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts section 187 in discussing how to determine whether a trustee had
abused his or her discretion. 50 While the Supreme Court noted that a
conflict of interest would be a factor in deciding whether an
administrator abused his or her discretion, it declined to provide
additional guidance regarding such inquiries. 51 Consequently, the
circuits have established their own standards in reviewing a conflicted
administrator's denial of ERISA benefits. 52

n.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: STANDARDS USED TO EVALUATE THE IMPACT
OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Following Firestone, the circuits have used a variety of standards to
review the influence of a conflict of interest on an administrator's
decision. 53 The emergence of common themes among the various
standards has led to specific categories of review, yet each circuit's
approach has remained different from one another in some aspect. 54 A
majority of circuits follow the "sliding scale" model, which adjusts the
level of deference the district court will give to the administrator's
decision according to the seriousness of the conflict of interest. 55 By
48 See Muir, supra note 46, at 404 (explaining that the various perceived threats of misuse of
ERISA funds were primarily "tied to the possibility that plans might terminate with insufficient
assets to pay promised benefits").
49 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1105.
50 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at Ill. The factors to determine whether a trustee acted within his
or her discretion are: "(I) the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the terms of the
trust; (2) the purposes of the trust; (3) the nature of the power; (4) the existence or non-existence, the
definiteness or indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the reasonableness of the trustee's
conduct can be judged; (5) the motives of the trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising the
power; (6) the existence or nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with that of the
beneficiaries." REST A TEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959).
51 See Firestone, 489 U.s. at 115.
52 See infra notes 53-116 and accompanying text.
53 See infra notes 61-116 and accompanying text; cf Kohler, supra note 6, at 827-863
(describing the various "tests" the circuits used to evaluate a conflict of interest.)
54 See infra notes 61-116 and accompanying text; see also Kennedy, supra note 23, at 114663 (explaining the varying standards and continuing disparity between the circuits as to the correct
application of an ERISA standard of review in conflict of interest context); cf Kohler, supra note
40, at 827-58 (describing three tests: the Restatement test, the "sliding scale" test, (including a
"modified sliding scale"), and the "presumptively void" test).
55 This is the approach used by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and now the Ninth
Circuits. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 392 (3d Cir. 2000); Ellis v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d
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contrast, a "modified sliding scale" incorporates a slight burden on the
plaintiff to prove there was a conflict of interest present, while at the
same time providing more guidance to the district court regarding the
weight it should give the impact of the conflict of interest in each case. 56
Other approaches look at the "reasonableness" of the plan interpretation 57
or the "market forces" that some courts believe will remedy any inherent
conflict of interest. 58 Still other circuits approach such conflicts of
interest as "presumptively void" or decline to follow any specific
standard. 59 The recent decision in Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Insurance
Company was a direct attempt by the Ninth Circuit to provide a standard
for this issue that more closely follows Supreme Court precedent. 60
A.

THE "SLIDING SCALE"

The "sliding scale" approach developed as the most direct and
accurate application of Firestone for reviewing a conflicted fiduciary's
decision to deny benefits. 61 Under the "sliding scale," the greater an
administrator's conflict of interest, the less deference the reviewing court
will give the administrator's decision. 62 This approach is the most literal
149, 152 (4th Cir. 1996)); Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287,297 (5th Cir.1999);
Borda v. Hardy, Lewis, Pollard & Page, P.c.. 138 F.3d 1062, 1069 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Miller v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th Cir. 1991) ; Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157,
1160-61 (8th Cir. 1998); Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc).
56 This "modified sliding scale" is the approach taken by the Tenth Circuit. See Fought v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1004-08 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1026
(2005) ("In light of this lack of clarity, we capitalize on this opportunity to elaborate more fully what
a less deferential standard of review entails.").
57 This is the approach used by the Second Circuit.
See Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace &
Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255 (2d Cir. 1996).
58 The "market forces" analysis has been applied in the First and Seventh Circuits.
See
Wright v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. Group Benefits Plan, 402 F.3d 67, 75 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing
Pari-Fasano v. ITT Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 415, 418 (1st Cir. 2000) and Doyle
v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir.1998»; Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group
Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 1998).
59 The Eleventh Circuit is currently the only circuit that follows the "presumptively void"
standard. See Brown v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 (11th Cir. 1990).
Previously, the Ninth Circuit used the "presumptively void" standard, until its decision in Abatie v.
Alta Health & Life Insurance Company. See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 969. See also infra notes 109-116
and accompanying text. The District of Columbia Circuit has not addressed the issue of how district
courts should treat a conflict of interest. See Wagener v. SBC Pension Benefit Plan-Non Bargained
Program, 407 F.3d 395, 402-03 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
60 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 967. See also infra notes 134-65 and accompanying text.
61 See Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 826 (10th Cir.1996); see also
Kevin Walker Beatty, Comment, A Decade of Confusion: The Standard of Review for ERISA Benefit
Denial Claims as Established by Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733, 745-46 (2000).
62 See Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Bedrick v.
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application of the Firestone requirement that a "conflict must be weighed
as a 'facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion. ",63
Moreover, every circuit using the "sliding scale" recognizes an inherent
conflict of interest. 64 Such inherent conflict is present when an
administrator both funds a plan and decides whether to grant a claim. 65
An inherent conflict of interest presents serious problems because
insurance carriers have an incentive to unfairly deny close claims in
order to keep costs down. 66 By denying close claims, insurers can keep
rates competitive and garner more contracts. 67 This creates the potential
for deserving claims to be denied on the basis of financial considerations
rather than on the merits. 68 Moreover, such denials would be contrary to
ERISA's goal of providing expected benefits to participants. 69
Though all recognize inherent conflicts of interest, the "slidingscale" circuits differ somewhat in the burdens of proof they place on
plaintiffs and plan administrators. 7o Some circuits first determine
whether the administrator's decision appears reasonable, then adjust the
level of deference based on the administrator's conflict of interest. 71
Other circuits require the plaintiff to show that a conflict of interest was
present when the administrator made the claims decision. 72 One circuit
Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1996)).
63 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, lIS (1989); see also Muir, supra
note 46, at 415.
64 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 966-67 (using the term "structural" conflict of interest); Fought v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1004 (lOth Cif. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1026
(2005); Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cif. 2000); Vega v. Nat'l
Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287,296 (5th Cif. 1999) (citing Salley v. E.!. DuPont De Nemours &
Co., 966 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1992) and using the term "self-interested administrator with
discretionary authority"); Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1998); Borda v.
Hardy, Lewis, Pollard & Page, P.C., 138 F.3d 1062, 1069 (6th Cif. 1998) (saying that application of
the arbitrary and capricious standard "should be shaped by the circumstances of the inherent conflict
of interest; Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cif. 1993).
65 See Kohler, supra note 6, at 815.
66 See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 388.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
70 See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
71 See Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 341-43 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Evans
v. UnumProvident Corp., 434 F.3d 866, 876 (6th Cif. 2006) (quoting Baker v. United Mine Workers
of America Health & Retirement Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1991)) (stating that the court
will uphold a decision if "'it is the result of a deliberate principled reasoning process, [sic] and if it is
supported by substantial evidence."').
72 See Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff
has the burden to "present material, probative evidence demonstrating that (I) a palpable conflict of
interest or a serious procedural irregularity existed, which (2) caused a serious breach of the plan
administrator's fiduciary duty to [the claimant]." (citations omitted)) The threshold is low to prove
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focuses on the adequacy of the record to encourage both parties to
"assemble the evidence that best supports their case at the administrator's
level.,,73 In each of these situations there remains an inverse relationship
between an administrator's conflict of interest and the deference granted
by the court. 74 While the plaintiff may benefit under this approach, the
problem remains that the level of adjustment courts must make for the
conflict of interest is unclear and unpredictable. 75
B.

THE "MODIFIED SLIDING SCALE"

Faced with the ambiguity of the "sliding scale" approach, the Tenth
Circuit has adopted a "modified" approach that maintains the balance of
deference in relation to the conflict but places a burden on the plaintiff to
show that a conflict existed at aU. 76 The Tenth Circuit combines the
"sliding scale" standard with a burden on the plaintiff to show there is a
conflict of interest. 77
This approach has the benefit of giving
administrators deferential review, while also creating a more predictable
system for plaintiffs. 78
The Tenth Circuit has formulated a clear analytical framework
whereby the district court defines the type of conflict of interest and then
applies an appropriate standard of review to the particular case. 79 In
Fought v. UNUM Life Insurance Company of America, the Tenth Circuit
held that in a case of a denial of coverage, if there existed an identified
type of conflict of interest (e.g., an "inherent" conflict of interest, a
"proven" conflict of interest, or a "serious procedural irregularity") the
court would automatically reduce the deference afforded the plan
administrator. 8o Thus, the administrator bears the burden of proving the
reasonableness of its decision pursuant to the court's "arbitrary and
capricious" standard. 81 If a "standard" conflict of interest is present, the
the burden because the plaintiff only has to show the conflict has "'some connection to the
substantive decision reached.'" [d. at 1161 (citations omitted).
73 See Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 298 (5th Cir. 1999).
74 See, e.g., Pinto, 214 F.3d at 392-93; Booth, 201 F.3d at 343; Woo, 144 F.3d at 1160-61;
Vega, 188 F.3d at 297.
75 See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 392; Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997,1004-05
(10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1026 (2005). Cf Muir, supra note 46, at 417 (arguing that
the "sliding scale" creates an unpredictable system for administrators). This unpredictability could
lead to overly cautious administrators granting more claims and thus raising rates. See id.
76 See Fought, 379 F.3d 997 at 1004-07 .
77 See id. at 1005; see also Bogan & Fu, supra note 9, at 657.
78 See infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
79 See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1004-06.
80 See id. at 1006.
81 See id.
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conflict would be taken as a factor by the district court when reviewing
the administrator's decision. 82 While there is some question regarding
the difference between what has been termed a "standard" and an
"inherent" conflict of interest,83 this approach provides a sound
framework and the most guidance to district courts.
According to the Tenth Circuit, a "standard" conflict of interest is
the default evaluation level if a plaintiff cannot prove a serious conflict
of interest. 84 Yet the difference between an inherent, serious conflict of
interest and a standard conflict of interest is not well defined. 85 The
Tenth Circuit recently clarified this difference in Adamson v. UNUM Life
Insurance Company, stating, "Some proof (supplied by the claimant)
must identify a conflict that could plausibly jeopardize the plan
administrator's impartiality.,,86 After Adamson, the threshold for a
plaintiff to show an inherent conflict of interest and receive a less
deferential review of the administrator's decision appears to be low. 87
In cases of "inherent" conflict, the burden shifts to the plan
administrator to prove "that its interpretation of the terms of the plan is
reasonable and that its application of those terms to the claimant is
supported by substantial evidence. ,,88 The court will then determine
whether "the decision was a reasoned application of the terms of the plan
to the particular case, untainted by the conflict of interest. ,,89 This
burden-shifting model advantages plaintiffs because insurance
companies must justify claim denials and district courts treat denials of
benefits cautiously.90
In cases of "standard" conflict, the conflict of interest is weighed as
See id. at 1005.
See Bogan & Fu, supra note 9, at 658-61.
84 See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005.
85 See id.; see also Bogan & Fu, supra note 9, at 658-61. For example, an inherent conflict
of interest exists when both insurer and administrator of the plan are the same. Fought, 379 F.3d at
1006. However, merely showing that the administrator is an employee of the company that pays for
the benefits is not enough to prove a conflict. Id. at 1005. Something more must be proven by the
plaintiff to establish the inherent conflict of interest, which the court does not explain in the Fought
opinion. See Bogan and Fu, supra note 9 at 658-661.
86 Adamson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 455 F.3d 1209, 1213 (lOth Cir. 2006). Accord Panther
v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D. Kan. 2006) (concluding that
"Adamson applies in the rare circumstance when the inherent conflict of interest is merely nominal,
and does not involve exercising judgment regarding the grant or denial of benefits").
87 See Bogan & Fu, supra, note 9, at 672 (advocating the premise that the more deferential
the review of an administrator's decision by a district court, the less likely a plaintiff wi!! prevail in
overturning the decision). It follows, then, that in a court following the Fought standard, the plaintiff
will have an easier time prevailing just by showing there was an inherent conflict of interest.
88 Fought, 379 F.3d at 1006.
82

83

89

1d.

90

See Kennedy, supra note 22, at 1174.
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one factor in determining whether there was an abuse of discretion. 91
While there remains some question regarding what qualifies as a
"standard" or "inherent" conflict, this modified "sliding scale" approach
provides more guidance than the normal sliding scale to district courts in
evaluating conflict cases. 92
C.

MARKET FORCES AND REASONABLENESS STANDARDS

Circuits not following the "sliding scale" place a heavier burden on
a plaintiff to prove that a conflict of interest affected the administrator's
decision. 93 These circuits either do not recognize inherent conflicts of
interest,94 or do not view them as serious enough to automatically reduce
the discretion given to the administrator. 95 Consequently, a plaintiff
must go beyond establishing that a conflict existed by also showing that
the conflict affected the administrator's decision to deny the claim. 96
Once the plaintiff proves the conflict of interest affected the
administrator's decision, the administrator is given little or no
deference. 97 Such an approach, however, results in an unnecessary
burden on plaintiffs 98 while reducing the discretionary authority of
courts. 99
Under a "market forces" analysis, a court will reason that the market
will remedy any negative effect of a conflict of interest on the
91 Fought. 379 F.3d at 1005. The following factors should be considered in light of a
standard conflict of interest:
(I) the plan is self-funded; (2) the company funding the plan appointed and compensated the plan
administrator; (3) the plan administrator's performance reviews or level of compensation were
linked to the denial of benefits; and (4) the provision of benefits had a significant economic impact
on the company administering the plan.
[d.
92 See infra notes 166-190 and accompanying text.
93 See Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (en bane)
(identifying that to require plaintiffs to prove that a conflict of interest affected the denial of benefits
decision placed an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs).
94 See Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing
Pasan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1995) (requiring a plaintiff to show that
the conflict of interest affected the reasonableness of the administrator's decision).
95 See Wright v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. Group Benefits Plan, 402 F.3d 67. 75 (1st Cir.
2005) (holding that market forces even out the effect of any inherent conflict of interest); Mers v.
Marriot Int'I Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that the mere presence of an inherent conflict of interest is not sufficient to alter the
standard of review and the plaintiff must establish an "actual" or "significant" conflict of interest).
96 See Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1255; Wright, 402 F.3d at 75; Mers, 144 F.3d at 1020.
97 See Sullivan. 82 F.3d at 1256; Wright 402 F.3d at 75; Mers. 144 F.3d at 1020 (supporting
requirement that the plaintiff must prove the conflict of interest.).
98 See Abatie. 458 F.3d at 966, 969.
99 See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co .• 214 F.3d 377, 387-88 (3d Cir. 2000).
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administrative process. lOO This is a philosophically different approach
from recognizing inherent conflicts of interest and utilizing the "sliding
scale" because the plaintiff must show that there was an actual or
significant conflict of interest that affected the decision-making
process. 101 Critics argue that litigation arises only in the close cases and
the incentive for insurance companies to deny the claims is too great. 102
On the other hand, under a "reasonableness" analysis, some courts
have interpreted the Supreme Court's standard of review in conflict-ofinterest cases as a requirement to analyze the administrator's decision for
"reasonableness." 103 Accordingly, an administrator's decision must
merely have been reasonable, and any conflict of interest is "a 'facto[r]
in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion. '" 104 Yet,
without clearer guidance to a court regarding how to factor in a conflict
of interest, this analysis may be unhelpful. 105 Consequently, both the
"market forces" and the "reasonableness" approaches simultaneously
increase a plaintiffs burden and reduce a court's discretionary authority
to correct for conflicts of interest. 106 As the Ninth Circuit recently
recognized, the Supreme Court did not intend such a result. 107
100 See Wright, 402 F.3d at 75 (reasoning that "the market presents competing incentives that
substantially minimize the apparent conflict of interest. . .. [EJmployers ... will not want to keep an
overly tight-fisted insurer. . . . [AJn insurer could 'hardly sell policies if it is too severe in
administering them. "') (citations omitted).
101 See Mers, 144 F.3d at 1020.
102 See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 388. The Third Circuit also reasons that employees do not have the
power to make their employer switch insurance carriers because of too many claim denials. [d. In
addition, many claims are made after an employee leaves employment, and so the problems are
unlikely to be known among the active employee population. [d.
103 For example, a court following the "reasonableness" approach would use an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review in conflict cases unless the conflict affected the reasonable
interpretation of the plan. See Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255 (2d
Cir. 1996). At least one circuit fails to recognize conflicts of interest but will evaluate how
reasonable the administrator's decision was. See Wagener v. SBC Pension Benefit Plan-Non
Bargained Program, 407 F.3d 395, 402 (D.C. Dir. 2005) ("we need not determine ... whether
plaintiffs have plead adequate facts to suggest that the Committee operated under a conflict of
interest under Firestone.")
104 See Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
10 I, 115 (1989); Wagener, 407 F.3d at 402 (quoting Firestone, 289 U.S. at 115).
105 See infra notes 166-90 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
107 See Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc). In a recent First Circuit decision, Judge Lipez and Judge Howard called for an en bane review
of the standard of review the circuit applies to structural conflict of interest cascs. See Dcnmark v.
Liberty Life Accurance Co., 2007 WL 914673, at *13, *22 (1st Cir. 2007). Judge Lipez wrote, "I
think our standard of review in cases in which an insurer also makes benefits determinations is
increasingly difficult to defend .... I think it is time to reexamine the standard of review issue in an
en banc proceeding.... I would be inclined to favor the 'sliding scale' approach explicitly adopted
by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits." [d. at *13.
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"PRESUMPTIVELY VOID" STANDARD

The "presumptively void" standard draws the clearest lines for how
a court should view a conflict of interest but results in an unnecessary
burden of proof on plaintiffs. 108 Generally, if a conflict of interest is
present, the court automatically shifts the burden to the administrator to
prove that his or her decision was not tainted by the conflict, but the
plaintiff bears the burden of fIrst proving the conflict of interest affected
..
k'mg process. 109
the deClSlon-ma
The Ninth Circuit formerly applied the "presumptively void"
standard, requiring that the affected beneficiary provide "material,
probative evidence, beyond the mere fact of the apparent conflict,
tending to show that the fiduciary's self-interest caused a breach of the
administrator's fiduciary obligations to the benefIciary.,,11O If such
evidence was presented, and the administrator could not prove that his or
her decision was not affected by the conflict of interest, "the court would
give no deference to the administrator's decision to deny benefits, but
would instead review the decision de novo.,,111 While this approach had
the benefit of being the most straightforward, it placed an unnecessary
burden on plaintiffs because plaintiffs would be unlikely to fInd such
information. 112
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, discovery is normally limited to the
administrative record, and most circuits do not allow additional
discovery in cases being reviewed under an "abuse of discretion"
standard. 113 Consequently, the only way a plaintiff can get a reviewing
district court to overturn an administrator's decision is to present

See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 966.
See Brown v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566 (11th Cir. 1990). See
also Muir, supra note 46, at 418 (describing the Eleventh Circuit's "presumptively void" standard).
110 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 966 (quoting Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 1317,
1323 (9th Cir. 1995». After Abatie, the Eleventh Circuit is currently the only circuit using the
"presumptively void" standard. See RCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc., 240 F.2d at 993.
III See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 966 (citing Atwood, 45 F.3d 1317 at 1323).
112 See id.
113 See id. at 969-70 (citing other circuits that limit discovery to the administrative record,
unless the review of the denial of benefits is de novo). See also Urbania v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw.
Areas Pension Fund, 421 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Perlman V. Swiss Bank Corp.
Comprehensive Disability Protection Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981-82 (7th Cir. 1992); Kosiba v. Merck &
Co., 384 F.3d 58,67 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004); Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1003
(lOth Cir. 2004), cen. denied, 544 U.S. 1026 (2005); Zervos V. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163,
173 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir. 1995); Elliott
v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 609 (4th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); Vega v. Nat'I Life Ins.
Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 300 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1167 ..
108

109
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conclusive evidence of a conflict of interest. 114 If the plaintiff cannot
conduct discovery, it is difficult to find the "smoking gun," or evidence
necessary to overturn the decision. 115 Reducing this onerous burden was
the fundamental reason why the Ninth Circuit changed its standard. 116

Ill. CHANGING TIMES IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: THE NEW ABATIE
STANDARD

Recognizing that a "presumptively void" approach to denials in
conflict-of-interest cases was not in line with Supreme Court precedent,
the Ninth Circuit recently changed its standard of review in such cases. 117
Formerly, under Atwood v. Newmont Gold Company, a plaintiff was
required to prove that a conflict of interest had affected an
administrator's decision. liS Due to limited discovery, this requirement
set a high bar for beneficiaries to clear in proving that an administrator
had abused his or her discretion. 119 In 2006, in Abatie v. Alta Health &
Life Insurance Company, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed
this burden by effectively joining the majority of circuits in following a
"sliding scale" standard. 120 A plaintiff beneficiary can now show an
administrator was acting under an inherent conflict of interest and
thereby reduce the deference given to the administrator by the district
court. 121
In Abatie, the Ninth Circuit overturned the Atwood decision,
holding that the burden on plaintiffs under Atwood was a
misinterpretation of Supreme Court precedent. 122 The court rejected the
"presumptively void" standard as placing an unnecessary burden on
plaintiffs and set forth three reasons why Atwood was incorrect: (1)
Atwood's burden-shifting scheme did not properly grant judicial abuse114 See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 389 (saying that when evidence of self-dealing is required, "direct
evidence of a conflict is rarely likely to appear in any plan administrator's decision."
115 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 969
(recognizing that because discovery was limited to the
administrative record, outside evidence of company incentives to deny claims would not be available
to plaintiffs.)
116 See id.
117 See id. at 966.
118 See Atwood, 458 F.3d at 1323.
119 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 969.
120 See Feinberg, supra note 28, at 10.
121 See Abatie. 458 F.3d at 969.
122 See id. at 959. For a general overview of the holdings of the Abatie decision see generally
John K. DiMugno, Structural Conflicts of Interest and Abuse of Discretion Review in ERISA Benefits
Litigation: The Ninth Circuit Charts a New Course in Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Insurance
Company, 28 No. 15 INS. LITIG. REp. 537 (2006). See also generally Feinberg, supra note 28.
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of-discretion review in all cases where the terms of the plan conferred
discretion on the administrator; (2) Atwood ignored the trust-law
requirement that the court weigh a plan administrator's conflict of
interest as a factor in an abuse-of-discretion review (thereby creating an
additional burden on plaintiffs rather than a judicial evaluation of the
motive of the conflicted administrator); and (3) the burden placed on
plaintiffs by Atwood created an incentive for administrators to suppress
evidence of a conflict. 123 Thus, Abatie directly rejected the "smoking
gun" required of plaintiffs under Atwood. 124
The new Abatie standard ensures that plaintiffs will have the benefit
of an "abuse of discretion" review in all cases in which the court
considers the inherent conflict of a plan administrator serving also as the
fiduciary. 125 The Ninth Circuit stated that its approach was similar to
that of other circuits but consciously rejected the "sliding scale"
metaphor. 126 The Abatie decision instructs each district court to conduct
its "abuse of discretion review, tempered by skepticism commensurate
with the plan administrator's conflict of interest.. .. "l27 According to the
court, the approach is straightforward and "nothing 'slides. '" 128
However, despite casting off the label, the Ninth Circuit effectively
joined the "sliding scale" majority of circuits. 129 Though Abatie removes
the onerous burden on plaintiffs, district courts still need more guidance
to evaluate the effect of a conflict of interest. 130
IV. STRIKING THE PROPER BALANCE: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
CONSTRUCTIVE GUIDANCE

The Ninth Circuit took a positive step in lessening the burden on
plaintiffs, but the Abatie decision leaves district courts without clear
guidance on the extent to which a conflict of interest affects the "abuse
of discretion" standard. 131 Instead, the Ninth Circuit should have adopted

123

124

See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 966-67.
See id. at 969.

125 Id. ("Going forward, plaintiffs will have the benefit of an abuse of discretion review that
always considers the inherent conflict when a plan administrator is also the fiduciary, even in the
absence of 'smoking gun' evidence of conflict.").
126 Id. at 967.
127 Id. at 959.
128 Id. at 968.
129 See Feinberg, supra note 28, at 11.
130 See infra notes 165-89 and accompanying text.
131 See infra notes 133-64 and accompanying text.
Abatie also addresses issues of plan
interpretation, opening discovery to discover conflicts of interest, evidence that a court may
consider, and procedural irregularities. See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 964-65, 969-73. Individual analysis
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a standard similar to that of the Tenth Circuit, rather than creating a new,
amorphous standard. The Tenth Circuit's analytical framework guides
district courts in determining the amount of deference to give the
conflicted administrator based on the type of conflict of interest, which
adds clarity and predictability to the ERISA benefits system. 132
A.

A FAIRER REVIEW PROCESS THAT HEWS TO SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT

The Ninth Circuit's recent Abatie decision more closely follows
Supreme Court precedent by avoiding the placement of an unnecessary
burden of proof on plaintiffs. 133 Under the prior Atwood decision, a
district court might not have considered a conflict of interest if a plaintiff
had not met his or her burden of proof. 134 The Atwood approach
bypassed the principles of trust law that the Supreme Court found
inherent in ERISA cases. 135 The Abatie decision instead follows
Firestone's guidance: "if a benefit plan gives discretion to an
administrator or fiduciary who is acting under a conflict of interest, that
conflict must be weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining whether there is an
abuse of discretion. '" 136
Moreover, by eliminating the burden to produce a "smoking gun,"
Abatie will make it easier for plaintiffs to receive a searching review of
an administrator's decision. 137 The new standard requires a district court
judge to engage in more fact-finding and analysis of benefit denials, 138
of the Ninth Circuit's standards on these issues compared to other circuits is beyond the scope ofthis
Note. However, the fact that the Ninth Circuit addressed these topics and set out the applicable
standards for each indicates the Ninth Circuit's intent to address the entire issue of ERISA claims
litigation.
132 See Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1006 (10th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 1026 (2005). Accord Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1174.
133 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 966 (expressly overruling the Ninth Circuit's earlier Atwood
decision because of its failure to follow Supreme Court precedent by placing an unreasonable burden
on ERISA plaintiffs).
134 See id. at 969.
135 See id. at 967. But see Langbein, supra note 6, at 208-09 (arguing that the Supreme Court
misinterpreted trust law in applying it to ERISA cases).
136 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. d (1959)); Abatie, 458 F.3d at 967.
137 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 969
138 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 973 (finding that the district court erred in failing to decide the
factual issue of whether a waiver of premium had been submitted to the administrator; rather the
district court "appeared to conclude simply that the administrator did not abuse its discretion because
there was evidence on both sides of the issue"). See also Feinberg, supra note 28, at 10 (quoting
Abatie, 458 F.3d at 973) (stating that "the district court must make its own 'findings of fact on all
contested issues. "').
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which will clarify whether an administrator abused his or her
discretion. 139 Several judicial opinions have stated that the judge would
have decided a claim or interpreted an insurance policy differently and
awarded benefits, and yet have upheld the denial of benefits because the
administrator did not abuse his or her discretion. 14O The Ninth Circuit's
fact-finding requirement may diminish such decisions, making these
opinions more straightforward and less frustrating for plaintiffs. 141
The new Abatie standard also provides some tools to plaintiffs to
reduce the deference given to the plan administrator. 142 The Ninth
Circuit set forth the following factors for a district court to weigh
regarding an administrator's discretion:
[E]vidence of malice, of self-dealing, or of a parsimonious claimsgranting history. A court may weigh a conflict more heavily if, for
example, the administrator provides inconsistent reasons for denial;
fails adequately to investigate a claim or ask the plaintiff for necessary
evidence; fails to credit a claimant's reliable evidence; or has
repeatedly denied benefits to deserving participants by interpreting
plan terms incorrectly or br making decisions against the weight of
the evidence in the record. 14
Additionally, plaintiffs can use these factors to conduct discovery
concerning the administrator's conflict of interest. l44 A plaintiff must
clear a high bar to demonstrate an abuse of discretion, however, and this
new standard may not result in a significant increase in overturned
denials. 145
139 Interview with Daniel Feinberg, Esq., Lewis, Feinberg, Renaker & Jackson, P.C., in
Oakland, Cal. (Dec. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Feinberg Interview] (on file with author).
140 See Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 232 (4th CiT. 1997) (citations omitted)
(stating that under a deferential review, "[T]he administrator or fiduciary's decision will not be
disturbed if it is reasonable, even if this court would have come to a different conclusion
independently."); see also Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 84, 89 (4th Cir. 1996); Doe v.
Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 85 (4th Cir.l993).
141 Feinberg Interview, supra note 139.
142 See id. According to Mr. Feinberg, the Abatie case opens up discovery surrounding a
conflict of interest rather than merely having the administrative record to rely upon to show a
conflict influenced the decision. Id. See also Feinberg, supra note 28, at 9 (quoting Abatie, 458
F.3d at 968-69).
143 Abatie, 458 F.3d at 968-69 (citations omitted).
144 Feinberg Interview, supra note 139.
145 See DiMugno, supra note 122, at 543 (stating that the effects of Abatie will be determined
by the district courts depending on the evidence permitted regarding a conflict of interest). But see
Feinberg, supra note 28, at 7 (arguing that the new standard was an important victory for plaintiffs
because the court listed many examples of how a conflict would lessen judicial deference), and
Feinberg Interview, supra note 139. Mr. Feinberg believes that plaintiffs' cases that would have
been successful under Atwood will still be so under Abatie, but the new Abatie standard will likely
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The new Abatie standard will also open up to discovery the claimshandling procedures of insurance companies. l46 Plaintiffs can present
evidence of an insurance company's unreasonable pattern and practice of
claims handling, while insurance companies are encouraged to produce
evidence that they have a history of neutral claims handling and that they
interpret plan provisions consistently.147 Insurance companies will want
to show that no financial incentives existed for employees to deny claims
and that independent medical examiners were used to review files. 148
This will create a more transparent claims-handling procedure and may
help claimants receive their due benefits. 149
The Ninth Circuit also kept the most plaintiff-friendly aspects of the
former Atwood standard by combining them with the new factors in
Abatie. 15o For example, Atwood's "presumptively void" standard was
presented as the strongest standard for protecting a beneficiary from an
administrator's conflict of interest. 151 After the presumption was met,
however, the court applied a de novo standard of review, which opened
up discovery and virtually assured victory for the plaintiff. 152 By
contrast, Abatie removed this guarantee by rejecting the burden-shifting
scheme while at the same time encouraging insurance companies to
come forward with information that the conflict of interest did not affect
the administrator's decision-making process. 153 Thus, by retaining some
discovery, the Ninth Circuit was both skeptical of insurance companies

aid even more plaintiffs. Id.
146 See DiMugno, supra note 122, at 543.
147 See id. at 543 (saying that "Plaintiffs will proffer evidence of the insurer's pattern and
practice of unreasonable claims-handling practices"; and see Abatie, 458 F.3d at 969 n.7 (giving
examples of evidence an administrator can present to show the decision was not affected by a
conflict of interest):
[Tlhe administrator might demonstrate that it used truly independent medical examiners or a neutral,
independent review process; that its employees do not have incentives to deny claims; that its
interpretations of the plan have been consistent among patients; or that it has minimized any
potential financial gain through structure of its business (for example, through a retroactive payment
system).
Id.
148 See DiMugno, supra note 122, at 543.
149 See id. at 543.
ISO See id. at 537-38 (stating the Ninth Circuit "charted a new, more plaintiff-friendly
direction").
151 See Meyers, supra note 3, at 947.
152 See Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Crr. 1995). See also
Meyers, supra note 3, at 947; Feinberg Interview, supra note 139. Mr. Feinberg believes that once a
plaintiff met the burden under Atwood, the insurance company could do very little to defend itself.
Id.
153 See Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 969 n.7 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc).
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with conflicts of interest and protective of plaintiffs. 154 By including the
listed factors for a district court to consider when reviewing a conflicted
fiduciary's decision to deny benefits, the Ninth Circuit kept some
important protections enjoyed by plaintiffs under the Atwood standard. 155
Although the Ninth Circuit has declined to specifically adopt the
"sliding scale," it has effectively joined the majority of circuits that
follow that standard. 156 The court explained that "[a]n egregious conflict
may weigh more heavily ... than a minor, technical conflict might.,,157
This is quite similar to a "sliding scale" standard in terms of the lessened
deference afforded the administrator. 15s Notably, at least one district
court within the Ninth Circuit has tried to turn to another circuit, using
the "sliding scale" for guidance in weighing the conflict of interest. 159
Had the Ninth Circuit recognized the "sliding scale" approach and joined
the majority of circuits in this standard, district courts would benefit from
the experience of the other circuits that have been applying the "sliding
scale" for many years. 160
Moreover, the Abatie Court faced the same problem that the Tenth
Circuit addressed in its Fought decision: "[HJow much less deference
ought a reviewing court afford?" 161 The factors listed by the Ninth
Circuit were meant to guide a district court in adjusting the level of
deference given a conflicted administrator,162 yet Abatie seems to mirror
Firestone's ambiguousness as to how to factor in a conflict of interest.
Firestone led to a split among the circuits, and Abatie may do the same
among district courts in the Ninth CircUit. 163 The Tenth Circuit's
See Feinberg, supra note 28, at 9; see also Feinberg Interview, supra note 139.
See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text.
156 See Feinberg, supra note 28, at 10; But see Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon,
Rehearings, 14 No.5 ERISA LITIG. REp. (NEWSL) I, 2 (2006) (arguing against Mr. Feinberg's
premise that the all the circuits are corning around to the "sliding scale"). Eccles and Gordon believe
the circuits are still struggling and thus this is a topic for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Id.
157 Abatie, 458 F.3d at 968.
158 See Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997); Pinto v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 379 (3d Cir. 2000); Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157,
1161 (8th Cir. 1998).
159 See Wallace v. Intel Corp., 2006 WL 2709839, *7 (D. Ariz. 2006) (stating that the "[c]ourt
would be inclined to follow [the] approach" of the Third Circuit because the Third Circuit applies a
heightened "abuse of discretion" review). The district court did not use the Third Circuit's reasoning
because the court was unsure how the Ninth Circuit would rule on the particular issue of the case.Id.
160 Consensus among ERISA practitioners is that the Ninth Circuit joined the "sliding scale".
See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 28, at 10. See also Interview with Joye Blanscett, Esq., Bullivant,
Houser Bailey P.C., in San Francisco, Cal. (November 7,2006) (on file with author).
161 Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1004 (lOth Cir. 2004), cerr. denied,
544 U.S. 1026 (2005) (emphasis in original).
162 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 968-69 (listing the factors for a district court to consider).
163 See supra notes 53-116 and 161-62 and accompanying text.
154

155

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol37/iss3/5

20

Cartwright: ERISA Opportunities in the Ninth Circuit

2007]

ERISA OPPORTUNITY IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT

583

approach, on the other hand, gives clearer guidance to district courts in
making this determination because it delineates between "inherent" and
"standard" conflicts of interest. 164
B.

CLEARER GUIDANCE TO DISTRICT COURTS: INCORPORATING THE
TENTH CIRCUIT'S FOUGHT STANDARD

By adopting the Tenth Circuit's analytical framework for conflictof-interest cases, the Ninth Circuit could clarify the "skepticism" it
instructs district courts to have of a conflicted administrator. 165 First, the
Tenth Circuit's framework combines the flexibility of the "sliding scale"
approach with a burden-shifting scheme designed to protect plaintiffs
from arbitrary and capricious decisions by the administrator. 166 Second,
a clearer standard may help guide conflicted administrators in making
benefits decisions, and may help make benefits decisions more
predictable for plaintiffs, and reduce litigation. 167 Third, the Tenth
Circuit's framework is a feasible extension of the Ninth Circuit's current
standard that addresses the concerns the latter court has expressed. 168
Identification of the type of conflict of interest a fiduciary has, as
delineated by the Tenth Circuit in Fought, will provide greater
predictability to administrators, plaintiffs, and courts.
The strength of the Tenth Circuit's framework is that it combines
the flexibility of the "sliding scale" approach with the proper shifting of
the burden to the administrator to justify the denial of benefits. 169 The
"sliding scale" follows most literally from Supreme Court precedent in
Firestone, and only limits a district court's review of an administrator's
decision by the degree of the conflict of interest. 170 The burden-shifting
scheme is the standard most protective of ERISA participants and
beneficiaries only if the plaintiff can shift the burden.171 By combining

164 See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005 (stating the new standard "(I) adheres to ERISA common
law, (2) promotes sound public policy, and (3) provides clearer guidance to lower courts, lawyers,
and potential litigants.").
165 See [d. at 1005-06. But see Bogan & Fu, supra note 9, at 643 (arguing that Fought was a
"laudable attempt to clarify this ... area of the law, however, the Fought opinion raises more
questions than it answers.").
166 See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
167 See infra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
168 See infra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
169 See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1004-05; see also Muir, supra note 46, at 420 (highlighting that
"[tlhe existence and importance of conflicts of interest in determining standards of review highlights
the reason for distinguishing among broad categories of conflicts.").
170 See Muir, supra note 46, at 415, 417.
171 See id. at 418.
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both approaches, the Tenth Circuit's framework avoids the
unpredictability of the "sliding scale" standard and the nearly impossible
burden placed on plaintiffs under the "presumptively void" standard. 172
In addition, the burden-shifting scheme creates a more predictable
system. 173 Administrators need to know in advance the standard against
which conduct will be measured so that they can predict the weight a
reviewing court will attach to a conflict as well as the way in which the
reviewer will modify the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 174 On one
hand, an overly cautious administrator would more likely interpret plan
terms in favor of beneficiaries, which could negatively affect plan
rates. 175 On the other hand, an administrator who underestimates the
stringency of review might construe plans in favor of the sponsor, and
thereby violate the basic goal of ERISA in providing beneficiaries with
their expected benefits. 176
To solve this problem, the Tenth Circuit adopted Professor Kathryn
Kennedy's recommendations for applying a burden-shifting framework
to an administrator acting under a conflict of interest. 177 Professor
Kennedy justified this approach by saying the following:
This puts the plan administrator on notice that its decisions will be
judged for their reasonableness and provides the courts with a record
that must show that the conflict of interest did not taint such decision.
Such a result is still consistent with the Firestone admonition to
consider as a factor any conflict of interest, but provides more
direction for the courts in the application of the reasonableness
standard. 178

172 See id. at 423-24 (concluding that the flexibility of the "sliding scale" inevitably results in
unpredictability); see also Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 969 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (finding the "unreasonable" burden placed on plaintiffs under the "presumptively void"
standard was contrary to Supreme Court precedent).
173 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1174.
174 See Muir, supra note 46, at 417.
175 See id.

176 See id. at 417. In addition, denying all close claims in favor of the plan sponsor would be
inequitable and an abuse of power. Id. at 417-18.
177 See Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1005-06 (10th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 544 U.S. 1026 (2005) (citing and adopting the procedure for decreasing deference in
inherent conflict of interest cases proposed by Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in
ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1083, 1173-74 (2001».
178 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1174. Contra Muir, supra note 46, at 419-20. Muir
criticizes this approach because it
combines a harsh gateway analysis with the ambiguity of the sliding scale "standard." Under this
formulation, a participant who simply alleges a lack of impartiality will not avoid application of the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Instead, as is usual in the multi-step approach, the
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Thus, a burden-shifting scheme proactively informs administrators
rather than merely reactively reviewing their decisions. 179
Moreover, incorporation of the burden-shifting framework is a
feasible addition to the Ninth Circuit's current Abatie analysis. First, the
court has articulated its skepticism of conflicted fiduciaries and has
recommended that an administrator demonstrate that the conflict of
interest did not playa role in the decision-making process. 180 Rather
than placing a formal burden on defendant administrators, however, the
Ninth Circuit left it up to administrators to voluntarily give the
information about the conflict of interest. 181 Instead, the Tenth Circuit's
burden-shifting framework provides guidelines to an independent
judiciary to evaluate the extent of the conflict, which protects plaintiffs
from arbitrary and capricious decisions by administrators. 182
Second, the Ninth Circuit sought to avoid a "smoking gun"
requirement for plaintiffs to prevail and highlighted the importance of
having a system in which cases are decided according to their individual
facts and circumstances yet without placing an extra burden on
plaintiffs. 183 Applying the Tenth Circuit approach, each category of
conflict of interest incorporates the conflict as a factor and provides
additional guidelines to a district court in its analysis. l84 A company
aware of which conflict of interest it operates under will be encouraged
to be as open as possible about its decision-making process and give
transparency to its operation. 185 A plaintiff will also have greater clarity
regarding his or her chances of success in district court. 186
The current Ninth Circuit Abatie standard leaves much to the district

claimant must present evidence both of a conflict and that the conflict caused the fiduciary to
seriously breach a fiduciary obligation. . .. [B]y meeting this high hurdle all the claimant has
achieved is to have the fiduciary'S decision reviewed according to a sliding scale adjustment to the
arbitrary and capricious standard.
Id. at 419-20 (citations omitted).
179 See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 1174.
180 See Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 968-69 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (directing the district court to adjust its "level of skepticism" according to the facts and
circumstances in the specific case); see also Feinberg, supra note 28, at 9 (stating the "the [Ninth
Circuit) is skeptical of an insurance company's ability to act in a true fiduciary capacity because of
its inherent financial conflict of interest.").
181 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 969 & n.7.
182 See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005-07.
183 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 969.
184 See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005-07.
185 Cf DiMugno, supra note 122, at 543 (predicting that under Abatie "insurers will proffer
evidence of their history of using only neutral, independent medical examiners, consistently
interpreting plan provisions, and the absence of financial incentives for employees to deny claims.").
186 See Fought, 379 F.3d at 1005.
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judge's discretion, which was the problem the Tenth Circuit sought to
remedy in Fought. IS? The Tenth Circuit's framework provides more
predictability in conflict-of-interest cases and would be a feasible
addition to the Ninth Circuit's current standard that addresses the
concerns already articulated by the court. ISS Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
should adopt the Fought model and give more guidance to district courts
reviewing an administrator's denials of benefits. IS9
V.

CONCLUSION

The federal government created ERISA in part to allow
beneficiaries who have been denied benefits an avenue of appeal in the
federal court system. l90 Additionally, ERISA was meant to provide
streamlined processes to keep costs down and plans affordable for
employers. 191
The Supreme Court was clear in its rule that
administrators could be given abuse-of-discretion review if they were
granted discretion to interpret the terms of a benefits plan. 192 The Fought
"sliding scale" standard, in conjunction with the proposed
categorizations of conflicted administrators, meets these goals and
conforms to Supreme Court precedent. 193
Categorizing conflicts of interest gives guidance to district courts
for weighing the effect of a conflict against the discretion granted to a
plan administrator. 194 This guidance will lead to more consistent and
predictable rulings and provide clarity for all parties. 195 The number of
standards currently in use in the circuits demonstrates that clearer
guidelines are needed to improve predictability in the system and fulfill
the goals of ERISA. 196
See id. at 1004-05.
See supra notes 168-85 and accompanying text.
189 See Mu~, supra note 46, at 420 (stating "[tlhe existence and importance of conflicts of
interest in determining standards of review highlights the reason for distinguishing among broad
categories of conflicts.").
190 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat. 832) 4639, 4664).
191 See id.; see also Abramov, supra note 17, at 1381-82.
192 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at liS; see also Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Inc. Co., 458 F.3d
955,963 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
193 See Beatty, supra note 60, at 745-46 (stating that "the 'sliding scale' approach more
accurately reflects the standard established in Firestone.") (citing Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
128 F.3d 1263, 1267 (8th Cir. 1997)).
194 See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 165-89 and accompanying text.
196 The Supreme Court has yet to revisit the issues of conflicted fiduciaries since its Firestone
decision. See Eccles and Gordon, supra note 156, at 2. Fought, in which the Tenth Circuit modified
187
188
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Abatie's "abuse of discretion review, tempered by skepticism,,197 is
unfortunately a new and unpredictable standard. Firestone led to a split
among the circuits and Abatie may do the same within the Ninth
Directing district courts to temper their review with
Circuit. 198
"skepticism" is no more instructive than the Supreme Court directing
lower courts to "factor" in a conflict of interest. l99 Applying the Tenth
Circuit's Fought framework will provide district courts with clearer
guidelines for weighing conflicts of interest in denial-of-benefits cases.

JILL V. CARTWRIGHT"

its "sliding scale" standard, was denied certiorari. See UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fought, 544
U.S. 1026 (2005). Recently, the Supreme Court deferred to the Abatie decision and granted cert on a
case involving a conflicted fiduciary. See Hawkins-Dean v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 161 Fed. Appx. 684
(9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 659 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2006) (No. 05-1424). The Court
vacated the judgment and remanded to case to the "Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of
Abatie." [d. Whether the issue should be certified by the Supreme Court is beyond the scope of this
paper.
197 See Abatie, 458 F.3d at 959.
198 See supra notes 53-116 and 161-63 and accompanying text.
199 See Abatie, 458 F.2d at 959, 959; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,
115 (1989) .
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